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This paper is a letter never sent to philosopher, and friend, Ágnes 
Heller. In this letter I ideally discuss with her the qualities and the de-
faults of philosophy in contemporary world, while engaging some of 
her recent positions on the topic. First, I outline some epistemological 
issues in philosophy, and I confront them with science. Then, I deep-
en the distinction between academic and public aspects of philosophy, 
and the “Great Divide” between analytic and continental trends, and I 
present a possible way to overcome this Divide. Finally, I outline a 
possible scenario for the future of philosophy.  
Keywords: Epistemology of Philosophy, Ágnes Heller, Difference Be-





Dear Ágnes,  
 
This is a letter I always wanted to write and send to you, and I never 
did. I never did because we all – and me in the first place – live in a 
sort of illusion of eternity, we do not have constantly in our mind the 
conscience that our time on this planet is limited, and we always pro-
crastinate something. Imagine if we constantly thought that we will 
eventually end our time, sooner or later, or, even worse, imagine if 
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we knew the exact date of our death. This scenario is presented by a 
very nice movie, entitled The Brand New Testament (Jaco Van 
Dormael 2015). In this movie God is a scruffy old man who lives in a 
small apartment in Brussels, and who pesters his wife and tyrannizes 
his daughter. Well, one day the daughter has enough: she sneaks in-
to God’s bureau, accesses his (“His”?) PC, and send to all human be-
ings the exact date of their death. Clearly, this triggers a major 
change in the world. I do not know if you knew this movie, but I am 
sure you would enjoy it very much! 
Anyway, this is not our case, and maybe because of this I have 
procrastinated, and I have never sent to you this letter, nor I took 
the chance to speak with you personally on what I am about to write. 
So, that this letter be as a partial emendation to that mistake of 
mine. That said, I start again. 
 
 
Dear Ágnes,  
 
Given that you like jokes, I tell you one. A Physics Professor of a ma-
jor University waits nervously outside the Chancellor’s office: he is 
there to solicitate the University to finance a new facility for the de-
tection of new subatomic particles. He mutters under his breath re-
hearsing his discourse. Finally, the door opens, some greetings, some 
small talks, and finally he presents his request, supported by a 
lengthy and complex documentation meticulously describing the sci-
entific impact of the results and the consequential benefits for the 
University in terms of rankings, external funding, etc. The Chancellor 
knew already not only the topic of this meeting, but also that the re-
quest is perfectly reasonable and of strategic importance for the Uni-
versity, thus she was already willing to grant it before meeting her 
Physics colleague. However, as Chancellor, she does not want to ap-
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pear too accommodating, thus, with a sigh, she says ironically: «Why 
you Physicists are not like the colleagues from Mathematics? They 
need no expensive equipment, but just a piece of paper, a pencil, and 
a litterbin». And before the other can reply, she adds: «Or even bet-
ter, the colleagues from Philosophy: they need no litterbin». 
I can easily imagine some of my Physics and Mathematics friends 
saying: “Hear hear!”. For the joke is funny because it’s true. In phi-
losophy there is no ultimate criteria to discriminate between what is 
correct and what is wrong, which is equal to say that there is no 
method in philosophy. In fact, in philosophy, either this method is al-
ways implicit, or, when it is explicit, it is itself a philosophical state-
ment! Let us think of the methodological sections in Kant’s first two 
Critiques. Those are at the same time methodological reflections 
about philosophy, and philosophical reflections about method. (Actu-
ally, I could say that the first two Critiques are but philosophical re-
flections about what a method is, and thus their methodological sec-
tions are meta-methodologies; but I will save this for another time). 
So, the joke is true – that is, philosophy needs no litterbin – be-
cause either philosophy has no method (at least no explicit one), or 
philosophy itself is a methodological reflection.  
In the first scenario, philosophy has no power to check the cor-
rectness or truthfulness or rightness of its same statements; the con-
sequence is that, at least in principle, everything that is stated by 
everybody can be deemed to be correct and truth because there is no 
superior criteria of correctness of truthfulness. For this reason, phi-
losophy need no litterbin: because everything is potentially accepta-
ble and accepted.  
In the second case, philosophy thinks that its duty is precisely to 
establish, or try to establish, this superior criteria of correctness and 
truthfulness: epistemology is a branch of philosophy; but the conse-
quence here is the same: what is the criteria for the establishment of 
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a criteria? Therefore, also in this case philosophy needs no litterbin: 
from the philosophy’s perspective, philosophy creates the litterbins 
that all other disciplines will use to discriminate between these disci-
plines’ correct and not correct propositions; however, from a general 
perspective, philosophy needs no litterbin because every criteria of 
correctness and truthfulness that philosophy concocts is potentially 
valid, and therefore, once again, this criteria that philosophy concocts 
lacks of a superior criteria able to judge such methodological specula-
tions presented by philosophy.  
So, on one hand, there is the risk that philosophy considers itself 
a sort of supreme discipline, the Queen of all forms and expressions 
of human intelligence, because philosophy has the task to establish 
the method that lies at the very foundation of those forms and ex-
pressions; and on the other hand, there is the risk that philosophy is 
but an arbitrary reflection (worst case scenario) or an amateurish re-
flection (best case scenario) on the methods and the foundations of 
the disciplines on which philosophy claims to have something to say 
methodologically – I say “amateurish” because sometimes philosophy 
knows little about these other disciplines, for the simple reason that 
those disciplines are so complexes, that it would require a double ed-
ucation (that is, an education both in this discipline and in philoso-
phy) to speak philosophically about them.  
Actually, I would add that these two points of view – that philos-
ophy has no method and that philosophy’s task is to establish the 
methods for the other disciplines – are just two perspectives on the 
same fact, or, more precisely, the two affirmations imply each other. 
The fact that philosophy has no method implies that philosophy’s task 
is to ask what the method is and consequently to establish the meth-
od (for itself and other disciplines), because philosophy is  a disci-
pline, it is an expression of human intelligence, and, as every other 
disciplines and expressions of human intelligence, it requires a meth-
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od, thus, the fact that is has no universally accepted method is the 
evidence that the object of this discipline is to find this method – for 
itself, and then for other disciplines. Vice-versa, the fact that philoso-
phy’s task is to establish the method implies that philosophy has no 
method because otherwise we would have a regressio ad infinitum, so 
that every philosophical establishment of a method needs another 
philosophy to establish the method of this method establishment, and 
so on. Therefore, the only solution is that philosophy has an episte-
mological status that is self-established.  
The evidence of this is before our very eyes: it is the philosophi-
cal relevance of the history of philosophy. More precisely: the evi-
dence of philosophy’s «self-established epistemological status» is the 
fact that history of philosophy is relevant for doing philosophy – not 
only for learning it. It is enough to open a philosophical text – both 
ancient and modern. We see references to Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, 
Stoic paradoxes, Descartes, Leibniz, works from thinkers temporally 
quite distant from the writer, and yet still considered inescapable ref-
erences for any philosophical text deemed to be taken seriously.  
On the other hand, if we open a scientific book, we see refer-
ences to past authors only in special “history sections” of the books: 
those sections are quite useful didactically, because they help to re-
construct the path that led to a specific scientific discovery, or to ex-
plain why a theory or a theorem bears its name, e.g. “Galois theory” 
or “Lagrange’s theorem”. But it is unnecessary to read and quote 
from Galois’s or Lagrange’s works (for instance), in order to write a 
text in group theory. This is at best a duty for a historian of mathe-
matics. So, while in a scientific text history is utterly secondary and 
what counts are the references to the very actual research, on the 
other hand in a philosophical text history of philosophy is utterly cen-
tral and necessary in order to give substantiality of this text.  
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I can reformulate this important difference in the following way: 
science is cumulative, philosophy is (somehow) recursive. The scien-
tific production of today is based on the scientific results of yesterday, 
while the philosophical productions of today is based not only on the 
philosophical research of yesterday, but also on the philosophies of 
the very past. Therefore, science always asks new questions, or, bet-
ter, scientific questions have a content that changes at every new 
discovery and progress: in fact, the questions of tomorrow are built 
on the results of today; for this reason history is not that relevant, 
because the questions of the very past are already included in the 
answers of yesterday, and therefore they are no longer the questions 
of today: today we ask different, new questions, because there today 
questions are the result of the cumulation of past questions and an-
swers, and, thus, of cumulation of scientific knowledge. 
On the other hand, philosophy always asks the same questions, 
with different terms or different rephrasing, or different elements to 
include in the answer, or different ways of organizing the answer. For 
instance, since its birth philosophy asks the questions “What is true” 
(methodological question in epistemology), “What is good” (methodo-
logical question in ethics), “What is beauty” (methodological question 
in aesthetics), “What is right” (methodological question in jurispru-
dence and politics), etc. Sure, the way of answering those questions 
varies from time to time, in particular because new scenarios are pre-
sent: new scientific discoveries, new systems of morality, new aes-
thetic creations or canons, new political systems, etc. Therefore, his-
tory is important for philosophy for two reasons: first, because phi-
losophy necessarily follows historical changes – since it reflects on 
these changes –, in this sense philosophy comes always last, and this 
perfectly confirms Hegel’s motto that philosophy starts its flight after 
a new moment in history has risen. Second, history is important for 
philosophy because there is a strong continuity between our philo-
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sophical questions today, and the questions of the past philosophies, 
therefore from the history of philosophy – that is, from the answers 
of the past to the same questions – the philosophy of today can al-
ways learn something, in spite of the temporal distance.  
A possible counterexample would be claiming that also physics 
always answers the same questions: what is the origin and the fun-
damental structure of the universe? But this is not correct: those are 
metaphysical questions. Physics answers very specific questions that 
somehow can be connected to those metaphysical questions, but 
again, this connection is object of philosophy of physics, and not of 
physics itself. In other words, physics aims to answers indirectly 
those questions, by focusing on more specific problems because 
these answers must be testable, which is the only condition in order 
to provide answers that corresponds to reality and not the vague, un-
testable and thus arbitrary outbursts of the metaphysician. At the 
same time, physics answers these specific problems by formulating 
laws for the (specific) phenomena it studies – laws that mathemati-
cally formalize the regularities of these phenomena; laws, not words 
or speculations. In sum, the questions physics try to answer are 
much more limited, and they are always provisionary, precisely be-
cause of the accumulation I mentioned before: because the answers 
of today are the basis for the questions of tomorrow. As such, physics 
needs litterbin – litterbin is the symbol of the success of physics, of 
its constant ability to improve itself and the answers it formulates. 
Therefore, physics, as much as the other sciences, are much humbler 
intellectual efforts than philosophy, because they seek to provide not 
with abstract answers, but with formalized answer to specific ques-
tions. 
This difference between scientific research and philosophical re-
search is strictly connected with the fact that philosophy has no 
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method, and, thus, requires no litterbin. This connection is based on 
two factors.  
First, given that philosophy has no method, then no answer to 
any philosophical question can be objectively and unanimously re-
jected, and therefore the whole totality of philosophical productions is 
philosophically valid – at least in principle: of course each philosophi-
cal author will eventually take side in the history of philosophy, by 
agreeing with a school, way, or trend of doing philosophy and refut-
ing other ways (principally, nowadays, to take side between the great 
division between continentals and analytics); however, in principle, 
that is, a priori, before taking position, every school or way, every 
possible positions is valid. The evidence of this is precisely the plurali-
ty of ways, schools and trends of doing philosophy. This is why the 
whole history of philosophy is relevant for philosophical research to-
day. Of course, it is possible for some philosophical writings to be 
censured because they do not respect some dictate or tenets (for in-
stance, anti-communist writings in a communist regime, or atheis-
tic/nihilistic writings in a confessional/religious community) – but this 
censorship does not make these writings wrong for philosophical rea-
sons, i.e., for reasons internal to the philosophical community. The 
proof of this is that censored writings are indeed read and studied, ei-
ther clandestinely or in places where this censorship is not in place.  
The second factor is that, given that philosophy has no method, 
then each and every author has to present her/his own methodologi-
cal analysis on all philosophical production – and this is done and re-
done from scratch every single time, that is, for every single new au-
thor in philosophy. Each new philosophical author must state, in an 
explicit and reasoned way, which authors of the history of philosophy 
are deemed to be criticized and which authors are deemed to be tak-
en as reference upon which building one’s own position. This is con-
nected to what I have just stated on taking position within the history 
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of philosophy: clearly, the distinction between good and weak au-
thors, authors of election and of rejection, is one with explicitly mani-
fest one’s alignment with a trend in philosophy. And all this is con-
nected with the fact that no cumulation of data is possible in philoso-
phy: if one has to do the whole methodological work all over again – 
at least the first time when one settles to which philosophical trend 
one aims to belong – then no methodological work is ever considered 
universally valid and generally shared and sharable. Again, this is 
remarkably different from science: the whole community shares the 
same methodological tenets, and this contributes to speed up and 
simplify the contribution in scientific production – moreover, this is 
also the confirmation that, contrary to science, philosophy always 
asks the same questions. 
Another evidence of this lack of method and of the complex and 
often negative consequences it arises is the style of philosophy. 
Again, we look at science first. Generally, the stylistic differences be-
tween scientific papers concern the discursiveness of the paper, 
whether more concise or more explicative, and this is also related to 
the organization of the content. For instance, a book in linear algebra 
is clearer than another one because of the way it presents its material 
– which is basically the same - (and only very secondary because of 
the presence of historical subtopics).  
On the other hand, philosophy is composed by a multitude of 
styles, that is, of ways of presenting a content. The spectrum can be 
very wide: it can run from formal demonstrations of theorems to dia-
logues between fictional characters, from historical reconstructions of 
publication , debates between philosophers, or lives of authors, to 
(fictive or real) epistolary conversations – precisely like this letter to 
you, Ágnes. I am rather skeptic about this liberality concerning philo-
sophical style, for several reasons. First, because this means that phi-
losophy is not identifiable with a unique genre, with the consequence 
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that a book that one recognizes as genuine philosophical production, 
another one would rather consider part of poetry, or literature, or 
mathematics, or history, etc. Second, because there is the risk of 
overlapping between genres: philosophical authors like Kierkegaard 
or Nietzsche belong to literature or philosophy? And literary authors 
like Thomas Mann or Dostoevsky or Hölderlin belong to literature or 
philosophy? And which book from these authors belong to which gen-
re? Third, because this plurality of styles further enhances the ambi-
guity of philosophy: the fact that each author can establish her/his 
own way of writing philosophy contributes to the idea of a fundamen-
tal and ineradicable arbitrary of philosophy, of a complete lack of 
common method and canon.  
In any case, the fact that philosophy asks the same questions, 
and the fact that there is no explicit, univocal, and unambiguous 
methodology to address such questions, can indeed convey the idea 
that philosophical questions cannot be ultimately answered. As I hope 
to have shown, asking the same questions goes together with having 
no clear and univocal method to answer them: one is the conse-
quence of the other. Philosophers ask the same questions because no 
answer to those questions is considered definitive, and no answer is 
considered definitive because there is no clear, universally-shared 
method to distinguish between right and wrong answers. Vice-versa, 
philosophy has no method because it seeks to formulate the method 
each discipline should satisfy when answering their specific questions, 
and therefore philosophy has no method to answer its own questions, 
thus, the validity of each question depends on the philosophical posi-
tion within which it is formulated, and therefore each philosophical 
position answers in its way, and thus philosophy asks the same ques-
tions.  
So, the unity between answering the same question and not hav-
ing a univocal, universally-shared method conveys the suspicion that 
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philosophical questions cannot be ultimately answer. The next ques-
tion is: then why keeping asking those questions? Why not simply ac-
knowledging that there is no answer to those questions, that the ef-
fort of providing an answer to those questions is an enterprise 
doomed to fail, that it is a waste of time and intelligence to address 
such questions? 
And I address this question to you, Ágnes. Because after high 
school you wanted to study physics. And then you went with your fu-
ture first husband, student in philosophy, to a class by Lukacs, you 
did not understand a word that was said, and you decided that you 
would have spent your life to understand it. And you did: you devot-
ed your life to philosophy.  
Have you ever regretted this decision of philosophy to the detri-
ment of physics? Have you have asked yourself all these questions 
and have you ever had yourself all these doubts about philosophy, its 
meaningfulness, its relevance? Have you ever questioned philosophy? 
And your choice of it? Would it be meaningful to still choose philoso-
phy, today? 
In fact, it is true that the face of philosophy has changed a lot 
since the time you made your choice. The main change concerns the 
progressive separation between two main “practices” or “places” of 
doing philosophy: academia, and the public forum. Usually the two 
were closer to one another than today: Lukacs was simultaneously a 
professional philosopher (a philosopher of academia) and a public 
thinker, and the same was for many – mainly European – philoso-
phers, such as Sartre, Russell, Cacciari, Jaspers, Arendt, etc. And 
yourself, of course. But today, it seems to me that the situation is 
slightly changed, because the political arena has changed: the bar 
has lowered at the point that the public would be unable to keep the 
attention to complex philosophical arguments concerning politics, so-
ciety, aesthetics… The world of today is dominated by a communica-
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tion that is more and more quick (the numbers of characters of a 
Tweet) and visual/oral rather than written (videos on Youtube, meet-
ings on Facebook, conferences on Zoom) – and this trend will develop 
even further due to the current CoViD-19 pandemic. 
This means that the public forum expects and is ready/able to 
receive discourse and discussions that are simple and fast. And this 
can actually be provided by anybody – any youtuber – with no specif-
ic philosophical training. This is actually connected to another trend in 
modern, “internet” time. This trend is the generalized illusion or sup-
position of culture, of having the right and the duty to speaking one’s 
own mind even on topics that require a high degree of specialization. 
For instance, vaccines. The No-Vax movement is a flea of our time, 
fruit of intellectual arrogance and ignorance that, unfortunately, the 
internet helps to legitimate and to spread, by providing with an ideal 
sounding board. So, the public figure of the philosopher is losing its 
relevance because no special authority is attributed to this, or, this 
special authority is interpreted as the legacy of a past and, thus, as 
unable to understand the present. 
The nature of the academic place of philosophy has also 
changed. You recognize this yourself, in many of your books, such as 
An Ethics of Personality. You write that the current situation in aca-
demic philosophy is defined by the tendency of publishing works of 
philology rather than of philosophy: works that dissect in a very pre-
cise, very rigorous manner works by famous philosophers, thinking to 
find new interpretations of it or new connections with other works. 
Such works are richer in footnotes than in original ideas: they might 
contribute to the understanding of the history of philosophy, but they 
do not contribute significantly to the philosophical understanding of 
our world. The problem is that publishers and committees for aca-
demic positions are keener to value those technical books for insid-
ers, rather than more original books that can have a wider impact. 
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(But hasn’t it always been the case, somehow? Spinoza had no posi-
tion in academia, and no philosopher professor contemporary of Spi-
noza is studied today as much as he is). In some ways, this profes-
sionalization of philosophical research and publishing presents a rem-
edy to the lack of methodology I have analyzed in the previous pag-
es. However, maybe the remedy is worst than the problem; maybe 
the remedy simply hides the problem without really facing it. In fact, 
this professionalization concerns the productions of works of “philo-
logical philosophy”, and not of “philosophical philosophy”. 
Ágnes, you have lived both places of philosophy, the public and 
the academic one. Some of your books satisfy the expectations of the 
academic community: The Power of the Shame, Beyond Justice, Gen-
eral Ethics, Can Modernity Survive?, A Philosophy of History in Frag-
ments, A Theory of Modernity… They reconstruct the historical devel-
opment of a debate about a philosophical topic, or they discuss a top-
ic by engaging what other authors have said on this. In sum, they 
have a place within the philosophical debate. Other books defy those 
expectations, try to force the boundaries: I would say, more or less 
all books since An Ethics of Personality. Those books have barely any 
footnotes. Sometimes they formulate sentences that belong more to 
the declamation than to the argumentation. They make a strong use 
of primary sources (Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Bacon, Hobbes, 
Pascal, Descartes, Kant, Hegel… the importance of the history of phi-
losophy!), by interpreting them in a free, spontaneous way, as if you 
read them ex novo, thus, without taking into account the huge 
amount of literature on these sources – in some of this literature you 
could even have found some criticisms to your interpretations. 
 
An answer to both the double issue of a too arid philological phi-
losophy, and a fresher but not so rigorous original philosophy, might 
be represented by the style and the aims of analytic philosophy. Pa-
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pers in analytic philosophy – and logic – aim indeed to present new 
ideas and contributions; they aim to make a progress in the 
knowledge. As such, analytic philosophy can interact with hard sci-
ences  -especially mathematical logic – in a more fruitful way than I 
know that you, Ágnes, are critical vis-à-vis of analytic philosophy. I 
know that you see in it something a bit sterile, all based on thought 
experiments and thus detached from the political and social reality we 
all live in. I somehow disagree with this, because I disagree with the 
preservation of the “Great Divide” between analytic and continental 
philosophy. In fact, both “styles”, both trends, have positive aspects: 
the continental has the worth of being attentive to the history of phi-
losophy and, thanks to this, they can avoid the mistake of repeating 
what has already been said in the past; the analytic has the worth of 
presenting contributions that are not merely philological, but that in-
vestigate new ways of addressing and solving problems – for instance 
by working on programming languages or using mathematical formu-
lations. Therefore, today I see a future for philosophy which maybe 
you missed: the possibility for philosophy to overcome this “Great Di-
vide” between continental and analytic by integrating the positive el-
ements from both styles. And this is indeed possible, thanks to the 
presence of both trends in most Universities, today.  
But I see another element for the development – and relevance – 
of philosophy. This is the work side by wise with other disciplines, 
such as, for instance, jurisprudence, medicine, ethology, biology, and 
mathematics. This interdisciplinary collaboration satisfies the re-
quirement of philosophy to present the methodology of the other dis-
ciplines; in this context the vague term of “methodology” has a spe-
cial and precise interpretation and frame for any discipline: it is the 
problem of the foundations in mathematics; the problem of the rela-
tionship between the powers in political systems; the problem of de-
ontology in medicine (e.g. euthanasia)... At the same time, this in-
Critical Hermeneutics, special (2020) 
181 
terdisciplinarity satisfies in a rigorous way philosophy’s aim to provide 
a methodology, because it forces philosophy to understand firsthand 
what the other disciplines really are. It forces philosophy to “get its 
hands dirty” from the real contact with other specialists, with the is-
sues and method and procedures of other disciplines, with experi-
ments, calculation, analysis of data. 
This requires from the philosopher a constant disposition and 
willingness to learn, to develop an interpersonal reflection and not 
just a personal one, to produce outputs and publications that are 
four-, six-, eight-handed, and not just two-handed. This is a philoso-
phy that preserves its aim and mission: by working side by side with 
the specialists of those other disciplines, the philosopher can develop, 
foster and give new impulse to the methodological reflections that are 
already developed by those disciplines, via the tools of conceptual 
analysis, theory of argumentation, mastery of various theoretical ap-
proaches to general, methodological questions. And this is a philoso-
phy that realizes its mission in a non-arbitrary, non-vague, non-
univocal, non-irrelevant way, because everything the philosopher 
produces is issued by real problems that the discipline (with which 
the philosopher works) encounters within itself (e.g. mathematics) or 
in its relationship with society and the shared world (e.g. medicine or 
jurisprudence); everything the philosopher produces is shared with 
the specialists with this discipline; everything the philosopher produc-
es is tested by the specialists of this discipline. Potentially, this can be 
a revolution for philosophy. 
In sum, I have no answer to the question whether it would be 
meaningful or not to choose philosophy today. If I could turn back 
time, I do not know if you chose philosophy again. Probably not.  
Would this mean that – using your terminology, Agi – would it 
mean that I am an existential failure? I think I am the least person 
who is entitled to answer this question. 
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I just know that I have some doubts that philosophy, as it is to-
day, can indeed be able to be relevant, up-to-date, zeitgemässig, in 
the long run. And doubts are the best possible starting points – for 
helping things advancing. 
 
Love and gratitude, 
 
Andrea 
 
